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Local Development Planning and 
Budgeting in Decentralized Indonesia: 
Missing Links in the Bottom-up Approach* 
Nerio Usui and Armida S. Alisjahbana 
This paper focuses on the workings of Indonesia's 
local development planning and budgeting mecha-
nisms after decentralization, where citizen participa-
tion becomes a central theme for al stakeholders 
including policy makers. If real local needs are to be 
articulated, bottom-up mechanisms needs to be 
strengthened through its institutionalization in local 
government structures. At the same time, it can not 
be overlooked that effective and efficient local plan-
ning and budgeting in decentralized administration 
structure much requires good coordination between 
higher and lower levels of government (vertical link-
ages), and between neighboring local governments 
(horizontal linkages). Indonesia needs to make the 
best strategic use of matching or earmarked grant to 
link development plans and budgets at al levels of 
government. For horizontal linkage, role of provin-
cial governments need to be enhanced to set up a 
formal coordination system. 
Keywords: Participatory Planning and Budgeting, Policy Coordination, 
Matching Grants 
1. Introduction 
Facing enormous difficulties in maintaining national integrity after 
economic and political crises, the Government of Indonesia (the 
Government) initiated a drastic decentralization program in fiscal 
year (FY) 2001. The hierarchical relationship between provincial and 
local governments (Kabupaten/Kota) was eliminated, and replaced 
* This paper was prepared under the Indonesia and Japan Joint Research Project on Indonesia's 
Decentralization, which was jointly supported by the Indonesian and Japanese Governments. A preliminary 
version was presented at the 5th Special Study Meeting of Japan Society for International Development, held 
on 3 July, 2004, Kitakyusyu International Conference Center, Kitakyusyu, Japan. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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by far-reaching authority delegated to local governments. The devo-
lution was in the areas of development planning, public expendi-
tures, and service deliveries. Provincial governments act with auton-
omy, but retain hierarchical relationships with the central govern-
ment. In the case of local governments, the election of local heads 
(Bupati/Walikota) no longer requires approval by higher levels of 
government. The local heads are accountable only to local parlia-
ments (DPRD). As a part of decentralization process, about two mil-
lion central civil servants were transferred to the regions. 
There is a strong rationale for decentralization in Indonesia, 
which has a diverse geography, culture, and natural and human 
resource endowments, and consequentially a diversity in local 
needs as well as large variations in public service delivery costs. A 
key objective of decentralization is to move decision-making closer 
to the people so that public service delivery is more responsive to 
the diverse local needs, priorities, and preferences. Development 
planning and budgeting are indispensable instruments in securing 
the aims of decentralization. Local governments need clear develop-
ment strategies that fully meet their citizens'needs, and this can be 
achieved through active civil society engagement in planning. A 
solid link between planning and budgeting that reflects priorities is 
also a key prerequisite for successful decentralization. 
However, the enormous diversity of the country can be a strong 
basis for centralization or top-down interventions, given that the 
Government needs to ensure certain minimum standards (Devas 
1989). Indonesia adopted this approach for more than 30 years 
under the New Order regime, and, as shown by the experiences of 
many decentralized countries, top-down approach is stil needed 
even after decentralization. The debate therefore tends to be contin-
uous over the balance between central control and regional autono-
my. A key challenge for the Government is to find the right balance 
between the top-down and bottom-up approaches. 
Coordination mechanisms between local and higher levels of 
government (vertical linkages) and between neighboring local gov-
ernments (horizontal linkages) acquire importance in local planning 
and budgeting after decentralization. In Indonesia, there are three 
levels of autonomous sub-national governments: provinces, districts 
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(Kabupaten/Kota), and villages (Desa/Kelurahan). There are also sub-
districts (Kecamatan) between districts and villages. Indonesia's poli-
cy makers need to consider how these different levels of govern-
ment can coordinate their planning and budgeting. A question is 
how higher levels of government can effectively promote their prior-
ities at the local level in decentralized administration structures with-
out interfering in local government affairs. Another requirement is 
an effective coordination network to maximize synergies with neigh-
boring local governments. Successful decentralization requires both 
vertical and horizontal integration of planning and budgeting. 
This paper analyzes Indonesia's three years of post decentraliza-
tion experience in local development planning and budgeting. 
Discussion in this paper is based largely on our findings in a series 
of field studies in Kabupaten Lombok Tengah (.Central Lombok 
District) and Kabupaten Bandung (Bandung District)1 . Major 
changes in local development planning practice after decentraliza-
tion are discussed in Section 2, Section 3 reviews local budgeting 
processes and implementation, and Section 4 focuses on vertical 
and horizontal linkages in local development planning and budget-
ing. The final section is conclusions and summaries with policy 
implications. 
2. Local Development Planning 
Local development planning in Indonesia has been, and stil is, a 
mixture of top-down and bottom-up approaches. The top-down 
process starts from discussions on national policy guideline (GBHN) 
at the consultative assembly (MPR) level, which is followed by the 
preparation of five-year development plans (Propenas) to provide 
guidelines on national development objectives, policies and pro-
grams. Strategic development plans of central line ministries and 
agencies (Renstra) are then based on the Propenas. These are fol-
lowed by annual national development plan (Repeta) defining priori-
ties for the national development budget. All local governments are 
required to produce a basic strategy statement (Polda) with a similar 
1 Filed studies were conducted in August 2002, and July to August 2003. Armida Alisjahbana covered the case 
study in Ka bu paten Bandung, and Usui joined the one in Kabupaten Lombok Tengah 
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status to GBHN at the national level. This is a master plan document 
incorporating political commitment with vision, mission, direction 
and strategy for long-and medium-term local development. Local 
governments use the Polda as the basis for their five-year develop-
ment plans (Propeda), strategic development plans (Renstrada), and 
annual development plans (Repetada). It is expected that local gov-
ernments will consider national and provincial development priori-
ties in their planning processes. In principle, coordination between 
different levels of government is secured through consultations at 
development planning coordination meetings. 
The bottom-up process of consultation involves each level of 
government formulating draft annual development proposals that 
are based on propositions submitted from lower government levels. 
The process starts with sub-village development meeting 
(Musbangdus) that feed into project proposals reviewed at village 
level meetings (Musbangdes). Similar consultation processes con-
tinue at sub-district (UDKP), district (Rakorbang Kabupaten/Kota), 
provincial (Rakorbang Propinsi), and national (Rakorbangnas) levels. 
On the basis of the discussions at Rakorbangnas, the central govern-
ment finalizes project proposals that will be financed by the national 
budget (APBN) in the next fiscal year. 
Indonesia's traditional development planning practices, which 
consisted of the top-down and bottom-up approaches, seemed to 
guarantee a delicate balance between central priorities and local 
demand in local development plans. However, in reality, they failed 
to pick up true local demands because local residents were almost 
completely left out of the decision making process from the very 
beginning of local development planning. Before decentralization, 
there was no separation of executives and legislatives powers at the 
village level. The village head was the chairman of the village 
assembly (LMD) and other LMD members were appointed by the vi-
lage head. The village head was not accountable to LMD, but to 
higher authority (sub-district chairman (Camat)). Moreover, the vi-
lage community resilience boards (LKMD), which were, in principle, 
institution for forwarding villagers'needs were dominated by village 
elites appointed by the village head; therefore, project proposals 
consisted mostly of priority projects of the village head and elites 
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(Antlov Hans 2000 and Leni Dharmawan 2002). Further, most project 
proposals from villages were filtered out at a series of coordination 
meeting, where higher level government's proposals were tabled 
without incorporating people's aspirations. Consequently, final pro-
posals were usually dominated by priority projects of higher levels 
of government, particularly those of the central government. Despite 
the formal coordination mechanism, local development planning 
was actually in the firm control of the central government. 
In the last three years, community participation has become a 
reality in many regions, which was confirmed by our case studies 
where many stakeholders expressed satisfaction with their deeper 
involvement in the planning process. A decisive factor in successful 
community participation is the regional government law (UU 
No.29/1999) that dictates village government reform. After decentral-
ization, the village head has become responsible to the village repre-
sentative council (BPD), which replaced the LMD. The members of 
the BPDs are elected by villagers. BPDs are authorized draft village 
legislation, approve village budgets, monitor village governments, 
and propose replacements of village heads to local government. 
Thus, the village head is no longer the sole authority in the village. 
These reforms have brought about more transparency and account-
ability into decision-making at the village level. 
Local governments are currently creating more genuine local 
development planning system, instead of the former centrally 
inspired systems, to tap into local demands and aspirations. Local 
governments have developed some innovative and creative 
responses, even though their magnitude and quality vary across the 
regions. Examples are: 1) some local governments reorganized their 
planning process by empowering traditional communities. As men-
tioned, the bottom-up planning system starts from the sub-village 
level. However, in some regions, local governments realize that tra-
ditional communities are more efficient than administrative village 
units in picking up local demands by stimulating voluntary participa-
tion of local people. A typical case can be found in the'Nagari'sys-
tem in West Sumatra (Widjono Ngoediji 2000); 2) local governments 
have been, and stil are, suffering from over-staffing problems aris-
ing from the large-scale staff transfer from the central government. 
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Many regions tried to resolve this problem by establishing new tech-
nical bureaus (Dinas and Badan) to absorb the transferred officials. 
Some regions enabled effective absorption of local needs through 
closer communications with their constituents by establishing new 
branches at sub-district level (Cabang Dinas Kecamatan) and allo-
cate more staff there. A typical case was found in KabLJpaten 
Lombok Tengah; and 3) some local governments, including 
Kabupaten Lombok Tengah, introduced discretionary transfers to 
sub-districts and villages to better support bottom-up projects. 
Despite these innovative moves and the positive impacts of the 
village government reform, many local people feel that they are stil 
outside the planning process. They claim that, even when they are 
invited to coordination meetings, it is a formality and their demands 
will not be reflected in local development plans. Some local govern-
ments, despite_ realizing the need for active community involvement, 
are reluctant to increase public participation because it implies 
longer planning and budgeting processes. To address this issue, the 
Government enacted a Ministry of Home Affairs circular letter (SE 
MOHA No. 050/987/SJ) in FY2003 to provide general guidelines for 
participatory planning, and to define procedures for consultation 
and participation in coordinating meetings. Development coordina-
tion meetings at local level are divided in three stag~s: Pre-
Rakorbang, Rakorbang, and Post-Rakorbang. In the first, heads of 
technical bureaus and Camats are invited to attend and guidelines 
for development activities are discussed on the basis of the local 
development strategy and shared among the participants to facili-
tate discussion at Rakorbang. The Post-Rakorbang checks for consis-
tency between the results of Rakorbang and the local budget for the 
coming fiscal year. 
Another new system with the circular letter is a scoring sheet for 
the prioritization of local development proposals. It provides a gen-
eral guide to setting quantitative priority rankings for al proposals. 
Indicators include degree of participation, consistency with local 
development plans, and impacts on human resources and regional 
development. Following the guidelines, local governments prepare 
their own scoring sheets. This arrangement can facilitate discussion 
at Rakorbang and improve its transparency. However, in our inter-
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views, there was an impression that the diversity of views in coordi-
nating meetings at lower levels may result in smaller, minimum 
scale, and less beneficial programs because the externalities across 
villages and sub-districts cannot be well exploited. The implication is 
that local technical bureaucrats, while respecting the bottom-up pro-
posals, may need to intervene to make necessary adjustments in the 
planning process. The success of the new scoring system depends 
on whether local governments can prepare a well-balanced mecha-
nism that can guarantee a balance between the bottom-up approach 
and top-down intervention (Usui and Catur Sugiyanto 2003). 
With the aim of closer integration between annual development 
plans and budgets, the circular letter sets an earlier local planning 
calendar. However, because local budgets depend heavily on trans-
fers from the central government, earlier planning makes it more dif-
ficult for local governments to consider revenue estimates in their 
planning process. For effective planning, lower levels of government 
need budget information of higher levels of governments. The 
Government needs to find a compromise between earlier planning, 
for closer integration between development plans and budgets, and 
effective planning reflecting real financial conditions. 
A key challenge for local governments is how to institutionalize 
participatory planning into government structures and planning 
mechanisms. In many countries, stakeholder participation is institu-
tionalized through councils and boards representing the main sec-
tors. For example, in the Philippines, stakeholder participation is 
built into local government structures through development coun-
cils, health boards, and school boards by laws (Guevara 2003). In 
Indonesia, Propenas 2001-2005 mandates the establishment of 
Education Boards (Dewan Pendidikan) and School Committees 
(Komite Sekolah). Many regions have not yet established them, 
although in some regions, including Kabupaten Bandung, these new 
institutions have become proactive in local planning and budgeting. 
The Government may wish to consider the extrapolation of the good 
practice in the education sector to other sectors. 
The major challenges that confront local. governments after 
decentralization are discussed next. As mentioned, al local govern-
ments are required to produce planning documents such as Polda, 
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FIGURE 1 New Local Planning and Budgeting Calendars 
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SE MOHA No.050/987/SJ keeps silence on the timings of Rakorbang Province and Rakorbang National. 
Propeda, Renstrada, and Repetada. Although, in principle, al these 
documents should be prepared in a consistent manner to realize the 
development goals revealed in the Polda, in practice they often lack 
mutual consistency. Some local governments produce only the 
Renstrada without the Polda and Propeda, because the Renstrada is 
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a political document, i.e., the performance of local head can be eval-
uated on the basis of the Renstrada at the end of his/her term of 
office. ~ven in regions that have the complete suite of planning doc-
uments, they may contain'cut-and-paste'type descriptions of each 
other. In particular, it is not always easy to find differences between 
the Propeda and Renstrada. In principle, the Renstrada needs to pro-
vide a short list of program and project activities for each sector 
identified in the Propeda. However, the vagueness of development 
goals in the Propeda has led to very wide interpretations by local 
executives and legislatures in preparing the Renstrada. This has 
resulted in failure to set up clear priorities, timetables and institu-
tional responsibilities for implementation. Government regulations 
(PP No. 108/2000 and PP No. 106/2000) stipulate that the Renstrada 
targets development activities funded only by local budgets (APBD), 
whereas the Propeda covers overall activities funded from al 
sources including off-budget revenues such as central line min-
istries'budgets or DIPs. This means that, under the current arrange-
ment, local development plans are fragmented according to funding 
sources, which makes it difficult to establish a direct link between 
the two plans. Further, it is difficult to assess overall performance of 
local heads, because they are responsible only for development 
activities funded by local budgets. In our case studies, local govern-
ment officials repeatedly raised this issue as a major fault in the cur-
rent requirements of the Renstrada. 
One of the key elements introduced with decentralization is a per-
formance based strategic planning approach. Local governments are 
required to prepare clear indicative targets, detailed costed plans, 
and their fiscal perspectives for planning activities. Although we 
found in Kabupaten Bandung, the Renstrada containing indicative 
targets to be achieved at the end of the plan for each sector, most 
local governments have not yet produced indicative targets, and, 
even where there are targets, they remain qualitative, rather than 
quantitative. Reliance on qualitative targets creates difficulty in the 
evaluation of performance of development activities. 
Before decentralization, local governments had been discouraged 
from building their own planning information system. Indeed, there 
was litle need to have it, because local development activities were 
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dominated by centrally prioritized projects, and financial resources 
were provided from central budgets. As a result, capacity building 
for planning and budgeting officials was absent. A lack of qualified 
officials now makes it difficult to establish much needed develop-
ment information system. Consequently, local development plans 
tend to remain only'wish list'. 
There is a need to refer to the unclear roles of Kecamatan in the 
planning process. At al levels of government, there is separation of 
power between the executives and legislatures. However, there is no 
legislative institution at the Kecamatan level. Camats and their staff 
are al local government employees, and their posts regularly rotate. 
These officials worked for technical bureaus of local government 
before filling their Kecamatan posts, and will return to technical 
bureaus after finishing their services at the Kecamatan. However, in 
the planning system, UDKP is granted the same status as other coor-
dinating meetings. One of UDKP's roles is to filter out proposals 
from the village level before they go to Rakorbang Kabupaten/Kota. 
If the Government needs to maintai,n UDKP, the authority of the 
Camat needs to be strengthened to guarantee that it can act inde-
pendently of its position as a local government employee to absorb 
village needs and aspirations. However, this will be difficult because 
the job position (echelon) of Camat is below that of heads of local 
technical bureaus2. 
In some regions, local legislators openly argue that they are rep-
resentatives of constituents and, hence, there is no need to foster 
community participation. In their logic, al of the people's demands 
can be incorporated into local development plans and budgets 
through their discussions at DPRD. However, there seems to be a 
general feeling among people that legislators do not represent them 
because voting is for registered political parties and not for DPRD 
members. This has been the practice under the current system 
which may also be the case at central level. The proposal for reform-
ing the local election system, by MOHA in 2002, is a reflection of this 
concern. 
3. Local Budgeting Processes and Implementation 
2 Echelon position of Camats is 11/8, while that of local technical bureaus heads (Kepala Dinas/8agian) is 1/8. 
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Local governments have long followed a MOHA manual (Regional 
Financial Administration Manual 1980), which regulates budget 
preparation, treasury administration, accounting, and reporting. In 
addition, MOHA annually provides budget guidelines to local gov-
ernments for the coming fiscal year. Under decentralization, there 
have been no clear guidelines for local budgeting and financial man-
agement; however, decentralization laws do require local govern-
ments to prepare their own financial management systems. In July 
2002, MOHA released a Ministerial Decree (Kepmen No. 29/2002) 
requiring local governments to adopt performance budgeting. The 
decree outlines the required structure of regional budgets, budget 
preparation and approval processes. It includes directives on the 
budgeting calendar, budget revisions, financial management, 
accounting principles, and reporting and accountability issues. A 
major change introduced is the switch from the tradition that distin-
guishes between routine and development budgets, to a unified 
budget with double-entry accounting. 
Because of the delayed release of the new guideline, many 
regions stil use the old budget formats and follow old budgeting 
practices. Over the period of July to September, each technical 
bureau formulates a budget team (Tim Anggaran) and draws up its 
budget for both routine and development expenses. These propos-
als are submitted to an executive budget team (Komite Anggaran), 
which usually comprise the Secretary of the Region (Sekwilda), 
Finance Bureau (Bagian Keuangan), Planning Agency (Bappeda), 
Revenue Office (Dispenda) and chiefs of spending units. 
Traditionally, the Bagian Keuangan (for routine budget) and the 
Bappeda (for development budget) dominated this process. 
Simultaneously, the Dispenda prepares revenue forecasts. In 
October, the team starts reviewing the revenue estimates and budg-
et proposals from each unit to finalize local budget proposals. In the 
process, a couple of bilateral meetings are held by the team with 
spending units to discuss details of their proposals. In theory, local 
demands are incorporated into the budget proposal on the basis of 
discussion at the Rakorbang Kabupaten/Kota, held in parallel with 
the budgeting process. 
Once the final budget proposal is approved by the 
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Bupati/Walikota, it is submitted to DPRD, as annual budget proposal 
(RAPBD), in October or November. The DPRD budget team (Komisi 
C) leads discussions and is authorized to make amendments to the 
proposal. Before decentralization, amendments were generally mini-
mal, because Komisi C members were already involved at the 
RAPBD preparation stage. The approved budget (APBD) serves as a 
ceiling on expenditures for the fiscal year. On the basis of the APBD, 
Bagian Keuangan as well as al spending units start preparing budg-
et documents, for both routine and development expenses, for the 
purpose of funds allocation. Then, the APBD moves to its implemen-
tation stage. 
In principle, budgeting is the most effective tool to realize the 
local needs, priorities, and preferences, established in local develop-
ment plans. In theory, the annual budget should be based on the 
Repetada which reflects the key strategies of the Renstrada. In reali-
ty, there is often no strong linkage between the plans, which results 
in another weak linkage between budget allocations and develop-
ment plans. There is a possibility that the present annual consulta-
tion exercise may worsen this problem. As mentioned, the coordina-
tion meetings are held annually at al levels of government, with dis-
cussions being dominated by issues of development strategy and 
budget for the coming fiscal year. The annual nature of consultation 
tends to make local planning and budgeting shortsighted. Local 
budgets tend to be prepared in each year on the basis of fund avail-
ability, even though medium-term strategic planning and perform-
ance budgeting theoretically become the new practices with decen-
tralization. Project selection is based mainly on ad hoc factors 
(results of the Rakorbang Kabupaten/Kota and bilateral negotiations 
within local governments) rather than medium-term development 
priorities. Further, they fail to take into account the effect on subse-
quent years'expenditures that result from current year projects. The 
Government may wish to consider the possibility of shifting from 
the current annual system to a medium-term consultation system or, 
even better, if it could adopt both simultaneously. 
In our case studies, numerous complaints about DPRD interven-
tion were raised by local officials, who had tried to maintain consis-
tency of budget allocation with strategic priorities. Evidently, DPRD 
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members often intervened for the sake of their own interests, disre-
garding priorities set in the Repetada and Renstrada. An additional 
problem in defining development goals has been their vagueness in 
planning documents leading to different interpretations by DPRD 
members in their discussions on RAPBD. 
TABLE 1 Aggregated Regional Budgets 
(Rp trillion) 
FY2000 1 FY2001 
Provinces Local Gov- Provinces Local Gov-
（％） 
ernments (%) ernments 
（％） (%) 
Revenues 13.0 100.0 39.7 100.0 29.4 100.0 79.5 100.0 
Previous Year's Surplus 1.2 9.1 1.8 4.4 4.1 13.8 2.2 2.7. 
Region's Own Revenues 4.0 30.4 3.6 9.1 10.1 34.5 5.2 6.6 
Central Transfers 7.8 60.2 33.3 84.0 14.2 48.2 68.8 86.6 
Revenue Sharing 1.7 13.1 4.5 11.2 7.5 25.5 14.0 17.6 
DAU2 6.1 47.1 28.4 71.6 6.5 22.1 54.0 67.9 
DAK3 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.2 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.1 
Local Borrowing 0.0 0.2 1.0 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.6 
Others 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.5 2.8 3.5 
Expenditures 11.6 100.0 37.7 100.0 23.1 100.0 69.6 100.0 
Routine Expenditure 5.9 51.0 25.1 66.7 14.7 63.7 48.3 69.3 
Development Expenditure 5.7 49.0 12.5 33.3 8.4 36.3 21.4 30.7 
Balances(% to total revenues) 1.3 10.4 2.0 5.0 6.3 21.4 9.8 12.4 
1 annualized. 2 SDO plus INPRES for FY2000. 3 Specific purpose INPRES for FY2000. 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
Uncertainty about the level of central transfers, which stil form 
the bulk of local revenues, remains a problem. Even after decentral-
ization, local governments rely on transfers from the central govern-
ment for over 80% of their revenues. In discussing budget propos-
als, Komite Anggaran reviews revenue forecasts before assessment 
of expenditure proposals. However, in the last three years, the 
announcement of central transfers has been delayed because of the 
late approval of the APBN. For example, in Kabupaten Lombok 
Tengah, APBD for FY2003 was approved by DPRD in late March 
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2003, three months after the fiscal year started, because APBN was 
passed by the people's representative council (DPR) in early 
December 2002. Late budget approval makes it difficult for local gov-
ernments to formulate APBDs with reliable information on their fund 
availabilities, and further risks inefficient resource management 
through delays in program and project implementation. This prob-
lem is exacerbated by delayed disbursements of central transfers, 
particularly shared revenues from natural resources, during the 
budget implementation stage. In FY2001, shared revenues from nat-
ural resources were disbursed to regions at a very late stage and, 
according to local officials, were delivered after the end of the fiscal 
year. As a result, many regions were forced to carry over most of 
their received revenues into the following fiscal year. 
FIGURE 2 Quarterly Disbursements of Sha『ingRevenues: 
Cumulative Share (%) 
75 
50 
25 
2 
Quarter 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
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Local governments are facing extreme difficulty in obtaining 
information on DIP budgets, or'deconcentration'funds. Because 
deconcentration funds are not included in APBD and are distributed 
directly to local technical bureaus via the provinces, even the 
Bappeda, which takes primary responsibility for local development 
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planning and development budget preparation, cannot easily obtain 
the information. In the case of Kabupaten Lombok Tengah, the 
Bappeda contacts al technical bureaus and the provincial Bappeda 
to obtain information. However, the required information cannot be 
obtained even after the DPRD approved the APBD. 
Local governments have long adopted the'target system'in their 
local revenue administration, where a certain target was set for each 
revenue item and the Dispenda, which is responsible for al local 
revenues, collected them. Even after decentralization, many local 
governments stil use this practice. The revenue targets are general-
ly based on the previous year's achievements, which have nothing 
to do with actual revenue potentials. For example, in Lombok 
Tengah, Dispenda officials acknowledged that their revenue projec-
tions are prepared・on the basis of the previous year's achievements, 
and by taking into account an inflation factor (usually at 10 %). This 
target system also has a negative impact on local revenue mobiliza-
tion because there is no incentive for Dispenda officials to collect 
revenues over the targets because larger revenues imply higher tar-
gets in the next fiscal year. The same problem can be found on the 
expenditure side. Major routine expenditure items such as utilities, 
supplies and rents are estimated from current prices plus an infla-
tion factor. To improve budgeting efficiency, the Dispenda needs to 
submit local revenue projections for budget preparations. 
In considering the implementation of performance budgeting, 
local governments need to fully recognize their obligatory functions 
(Kewenagan Wajib or KW) and their minimum service standards 
(Standar Pelayanan Minimal or SPM) that they need to achieve. 
Quantitative, not qualitative, indicative targets need to be based on 
SPMs. Furthermore, carefully estimated unit costs for each SPM 
must be utilized to cost up each project. However, Indonesia's 
decentralization was initiated without clear expenditure 
assignments3. Local governments'expenditure responsibility has 
been only vaguely defined, which causes considerable confusion 
3 Decentralization laws and regulations define roles of regional governments only in general terms: local gov-
ernments take primary responsibilities for public works, health, education, agriculture, communication, indus-
try and trade, investment, environment, land matters. cooperatives, and human resources, while provincial 
governments play coordinating roles. 
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about the demarcation of authority between the different levels of 
government (Alm, Aten and Bahl 2001 and World Bank 2003). 
Accordingly, the KWs and SPMs have not yet been established. Even 
if local governments adopt their new responsibilities, they are not 
easily reflected in their budgets, because the SPMs are stil not avail-
able, much less unit costs. In our case study areas, both govern-
ments stil utilize unit costing based on the previous year's budget 
adjusted for inflation. 
TABLE 2 Regional Governments Adopted New Budget Format 
Provincial Governments 
Local Governments 
Total 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
Total 
30 
348 
378 
of which, submitted APBD FY2003 
Total New Format % 
28 14 50.0 
309 
337 
185 
199 
59.9 
59.1 
Kepmen No. 29/2002 makes three key recommendations for local 
budgeting: 1) change from the traditional routine and development 
budget approach to a program-based approach (unified budgeting); 
2) change to a new budget structure consisting of revenue, expendi-
ture, and financing components; and 3) include clearer budget esti-
mates based on line item budgeting. All these elements are highly 
required to redress the problems involved in the old, but stil domi-
nant budgeting practice. However, there is now growing concern 
about the timetable for implementation, because the decree stipu-
lates that the new budget systems can be the basis for budget 
preparation starting in FY2003. According to the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF), about 60% of local governments reported that they have 
adopted the new budget format in FY2003. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that those governments have shifted to perform-
ance-based budgeting, because most governments have not yet pre-
pared quantitative targets which are indispensable requisites. 
4. The Need for Horizontal and Vertical Linkages 
After decentralization, almost al public attention goes towards civil 
society engagement through bottom-up mechanisms. Major donor 
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agencies have provided broad support for capacity building in local 
level participatory planning and budgeting. Although it is beyond 
dispute that Indonesia needs to establish bottom-up mechanisms, 
reform of the top-down process has received very litle attention. An 
inevitable reaction against the abiding centralized authoritarian 
regime is the profound aversion by local people to control by higher 
levels of government, particularly by the central government. Policy 
makers at the center also seem to be hesitant in advocating reform 
of central intervention, even they realize its importance for manag-
ing the country. 
Although national and provincial development plans should be 
based on an agreement with local governments (PP No. 25/2000), 
local development plans do not necessarily fully reflect the basic 
ideas and strategies of higher levels of government. 
Decentralization, by its nature, gives the highest priority to local gov-
ernments to respond to local demands. At the same time, local 
development plans need to be consistent with those of provincial 
and central governments. However, even with decentralization fully 
in place, some elements of top-down intervention are needed to 
ensure the priorities of higher levels of government are considered 
at the local level. The challenge is to integrate key elements of 
national and provincial development plans with local plans. 
Before decentralization, center-funded projects were managed by 
central line ministries through their local branches (Kanwil and 
Kandep). Local governments sometimes did not know anything 
about the projects even the projects were implemented in their 
areas. In such a situation, local project ownership was weak, which 
affect project sustainability (Devas 1989). Moreover, the New Order's 
centralistic and uniform approach to local development activities 
deeply discouraged local initiative and responsibility. Direct control 
through central line ministry budgets is no longer appropriate 
instrument in decentralized Indonesia. The central government now 
has available three policy instruments to foster the linkage between 
national and local development plans and budgets: 1) consultation 
at development coordination meetings; 2) development budgets of 
central line ministries (DIP) or deconcentration funds; and 3) match-
ing or earmarked grants, called OAK. The first two・instruments are 
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closely related, because it is the development coordination meeting 
process that determines allocation from central development budg-
ets to regions. 
In theory, there are two basic objectives in giving matching 
grants: 1) internalizing spill-over effects across regions; and 2) 
financing nationally prioritized projects in regions. Proj~cts to 
achieve SPMs in regions can be included in the second category. 
DAK can be a powerful policy tool to foster the linkage between cen-
tral and local development plans and budgets. Matching funds play 
a major role in the intergovernmental fiscal relations in many decen-
tralized countries. The Government needs to realize that DAK is a 
key instrument for exerting influences at the local level. Based on 
bitter experiences, many local governments in Indonesia may feel 
that even OAK-funded projects are centralistic and not different from 
DIP projects. However, through the DAK mechanism, the 
Government can improve local project ownership, because the ini-
tiatives and part of the funding have emanated from local govern-
ments (PP No. 104/2000). 
During the first two years of decentralization, the use of DAK has 
been limited for reforestation activities. A major reason is the difi-
cult budget position of the central government after the economic 
crisis. Nevertheless, it must be noted that budgets of central line 
ministries (DIP) stil contain funds for some decentralized functions. 
Some observers point out that central development budgets for 
FY2002 stil hold as much as Rp. 10-20 trillion to finance the devolu-
tion of functions to regions, even though the fiscal decentralization 
law (UU No. 25/1999) stipulates that al decentralized functions must 
be financed and managed through local government budgets 
(Hofman and Kaiser 2002). The implication is that the Government 
stil possesses enough fiscal resources for DAK. A possible justifica-
tion of the large DIP budget after decentralization is to avoid public 
service delivery disruptions at the local level, because many local 
governments lack sufficient capacity to carry out the newly devolved 
functions. At the same time, the large DIP budgets post-decentraliza-
tion reflect central line ministries'unwillingness to relinquish their 
control over development funds to regions. The Government should 
gradually phase out the DIP mechanism and shift available funds to 
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OAK. 
In FY2003 central budget, the Government allocated about Rp. 
2.3 trillion for non-reforestation OAK projects, including education, 
health, and infrastructure (road and irrigation). It was the first test of 
the use of the OAK channel for non-reforestation projects after 
TABLE 3 Central Budgets and DAK 
{Rp trillion) 
FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 Targets of DAK Projects 
Revenues 263 . 2 301.9 336.2 
Expenditures 315.8 344.0 370.6 
Central Government 234.1 246.0 253.7 
Routine Expendi- 190.2 193.7 188.6 tures 
Development Ex- 44.0 52.3 65.1 penditures (DIP) 
Transfers to Regions 81.7 98.0 116.9 
Balanced Funds 81.7 94.5 107.5 
Revenue Sharing 20.3 24.6 27.9 
DAU 60.5 69.1 77.0 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DAK 0.7 0.8 2.6 
Reforestation 0.7 0.8 0.3 
Non-Reforestation 2.3 
Education 0.6 rehabilitation of primaly school buildings 
Health 0.4 rehabilitation of rural clinics and local hospitals 
Infrastructure 1.2 
Road 0.8 provincial and local roads 
Irrigation 0.3 operation, maintenance, and rehabilitation 
Others・0.1 office buildings for new lo-- - cal governments ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Special Autonomy & 
Balancing Funds 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
0.0 3.4 9.4 
decentralization. Although PP No. 104/2000 stipulates that OAK allo-
cation must be based on proposals from local governments, the 
allocation sectors and project details of the OAK funded projects 
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were, in fact, determined by the central government. There were two 
critical issues in determining DAK allocations among regions: 1) 
identification of eligible local governments: and 2) matching rate set-
ting. To clarify the deficiencies in the current DAK allocation proce-
dure, we review these two issues. 
There were two steps in the screening process of eligible local 
governments for DAK. First, the Government ranked al local govern-
ments according to fiscal capacity. Fiscal capacity was defined as 
total revenues in the local budget, excluding the surplus from previ-
ous year, minus personnel expenditures. A fiscal capacity index (FCI) 
was calculated as a ratio of fiscal capacity to the national average. A 
cut-off line was set at FCl<1, which resulted in the poorer 238 local 
governments being eligible for DAK allocation. Second, the National 
Development Planning Agency (Bappenas), in coordination with 
three line ministries (education, health, and public works), reviewed 
sectoral indicators to check the eligibility of local governments. 
However, sectoral indicators were mainly used to determine alloca-
tion amounts, not for the eligibility test, because al local govern-
ments that survived the fiscal capacity screening could receive DAK 
allocations for the education, health, and road sectors (excluding 
irrigation). In practice, the Government first determined a minimum 
allocation, or lump-sum allocation, to al eligible governments, and, 
the remaining DAK funds were subsequently allocated on the basis 
of formulas established by sectoral indicators. Only for irrigation 
projects was DAK funding allocated solely on a formula. 
Since DAK is a matching grant, it is required to set a matching 
rate for each type of project. PP No. 104/2000 stipulates that a mini-
mum of 10 % of the project cost should be financed by local govern-
ment. In general, the matching rate can be determined based on two 
key factors: 1) differences in fiscal capacities across local govern-
ments; and 2) differences in financial return of projects, i.e., prof-
itable infrastructure projects or non-profitable social sector projects. 
Loc.al governments with higher fiscal capacities can bear higher bur-
dens in their counterpart funding provisions. Lower matching rates 
can be applied to non-profitable projects. However, mainly because 
of the tight schedule in finalizing the FY2003 budget, the 
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TABLE 4 
Rank in FCI 
FV2003 DAK Allocation Concept 
Road 
MA FA 
Education 
MA FA 
Health 
MA FA 
Irrigation 
FA 
???Local Government A 
(poorest) 
Local Government B 
Local Government C 
? ? ? ? ? ?
238 
239 
????
???????????????????????
?
?
Not eligible (FCI> 1) 
370 
X: eligible,--: not eligible. 
MA: Minimum Allocation (Lump-sum), FA: Formula Based Allocation (technical indi-
cators). 
Government failed to prepare clear matching rates for al sectors. 
Consequently, in FY2003, the matching rate of 10 %, the minimum 
requirement in the law, was applied to al (eligible) local govern-
ments and to al types of projects, irrespective of the differences in 
fiscal capacities and financial profitabilities of projects. 
In FY2003 DAK allocation procedures show a lack of understand-
ing of the chief objective of matching grants by the Government. 
DAK seems to merely supplement the equalizing performance of 
block or discretional grants (DAU) through its lump-sum allocations 
across al relatively poor regions. It is well recognized that the cur-
rent DAU allocation method fails to attain the expected equalizing 
impact because of various weaknesses in its allocation formula and 
political interventions in some regions (Lewis 2002 and Usui 2003) . 
Its poor equalization performance should be resolved by revising the 
DAU allocation procedure itself and not by allocations from DAK. A 
key challenge for decentralized Indonesia is its lack of effective poli-
cy instruments to inculcate national priorities at the local level. The 
traditional consultation process at development coordination meet-
ings fails to make an impact on local development plans and budg-
ets. It is emphasized here that DIP is no longer an appropriate tool to 
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control local governments. Policy makers need to reconsider the 
chief objective of OAK and establish an effective OAK allocation 
scheme, given that OAK may be the only available and effective 
instrument to establish vertical integration of development plans 
and budgets. 
Indonesia's decentralization process has resulted in a t~nuous 
relationship between local governments and provinces. The FY2001 
decentralization policy built a direct relationship between the central 
and local governments, while provinces were assigned coordinating 
roles. In practice, local development plans refer to the national 
development plans, particularly the Propenas, however, they rarely 
mention provincial plans. In some regions, local government offi-
cials do not even participate in meetings arranged by provinces. In 
the case of horizontal coordination, it is recognized that there are 
some local initiatives fostering cooperation with neighboring local 
governments to internalize spill-over effects in local service deliver-
ies. For example, the Kabupaten Bandung invites representatives 
from adjacent local governments to its Rakorbang meeting to secure 
coordination in local planning and budgeting. In another example, in 
Lombok Tengah, heads of local technical bureaus proposed a regu-
lar meeting with their counterparts in neighboring local govern-
ments to elicit inter-regional cooperation. However, they repot that 
this coordination needs the involvement of provincial technical 
bureaus. The Government is currently working on revising the UU 
No.22/1999 so that coordinating roles of the provinces are strength-
ened. It is strongly recommended here that the revision should 
enable a more active role of provinces in institutionalizing the hori-
zontal linkages in local development plans and budgets. The 
Government may also wish to utilize existing regional government 
associations (Appsi, Apkasi, and Apeksi) to foster inter-regional 
cooperation. In addition, provincial governments may wish to utilize 
the newly introduced provincial tax-sharing scheme to link their 
development plans and budgets with local ones. In the new local tax 
4 Major challenges of the current DAU allocation method are: 1) conceptual and design weaknesses of fiscal 
capacity and expenditure needs specifications in the allocation formula; 2) unequalizing effects of non-formu-
la allocations, in particular balancing factor allocations; 3) inappropriate sharing arrangement between 
provinces and local governments; and 4) prohibition of non-negative transfers. For details, see Usui 2003. 
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law (UU No. 34/2000), provincial tax revenues from motorized vehi-
cles, change of title on motorized vehicles, motor vehicle fuel, and 
the use of underground water, need to be shared with local govern-
ments. A vital point is that provincial governments are authorized to 
set up sharing arrangements and can assert their indirect influence 
over local governments by incorporating provincial priorities into 
sharing arrangements. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper analyzes the first three years experience of Indonesia's 
decentralized local development planning and budgeting system. 
The analytical focus is on the balance between top-down and bot-
tom-up approaches. With the implementation of decentralization, 
the balance has theoretically shifted to a bottom-up approach in 
local planning and budgeting. Even in the decentralized state struc-
ture, however, a top-down element remains necessary for effective 
linkage between development plans and budgets at al levels of gov-
ernment. It is very important for policy makers to recognize that the 
key challenge is on how to attain the right balance between the bot-
tom-up and top-down elements. The key findings of this paper can 
be summarized as follows. 
Stakeholder participation, particularly community participation, 
has intensified after decentralization mainly because of village gov-
ernment reform, which has provided better opportunities for vii-
lagers to voice their needs and take control of village decisions. 
Local governments also introduced several innovations. The new 
guidelines for participatory planning have accelerated stakeholder 
participation since FY2003. However, it is very important to institu-
tionalize participatory procedures through building stakeholder par-
ticipation into local government structures. An effective example of 
how the performance and accountability of local public services can 
be strengthened is stakeholder participation through the establish-
ment of Education Boards at the district level and School 
Committees at the school level. 
In parallel with supporting community engagement, the 
Government needs to find a more effective mechanism to link local 
development plans and budgets with central development objec-
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tives. The current consultation-based coordination system and direct 
control through central line ministry budgets are no longer effective 
instruments within a decentralized state structure. It is concluded 
that OAK is the most suitable tool to inculcate national priorities and 
to internalize spill-over effects in local development plans and budg-
ets. A major role of OAK, as a matching grant system, lies in its func-
tion of guiding local development strategies and budgets towards 
national priorities, without unnecessary interventions into local gov-
ernment affairs. Horizontal fiscal balance should be resolved 
through appropriate allocations of DAU. OAK should not be utilized 
to supplement the DAU's equalizing effect. Further, it is concluded 
that OAK is the most appropriate channel for donor resources to 
regions. At the same time, coordination with neighboring local gov-
ernments also needs to be fostered to internalize spill-over effects 
across regions in local service deliveries. The Government needs to 
strengthen the roles of provincial governments to set up systematic 
horizontal coordination mechanisms, given that it is clearly stipulat-
ed in Indonesia's laws and regulations that the particular mission of 
provincial government after decentralization lies in its coordinating 
role. 
Strategic multi-period planning and performance budgeting are, 
in principle, inseparably linked. Local needs and preferences can be 
realized through effective fiscal resource allocations in response to 
established priorities based on people's aspirations. Development 
plans and budgets should be kept under constant review, and 
adjusted to economic and political realities. Although about 60% of 
local governments have adopted the new budget format since 
FY2003, this does not imply those governments have successfully 
shifted to performance-based budgeting. In fact, local governments 
are stil facing difficulties in establishing local priorities. Linkages 
between development plans remain weak, much less linkages 
between development plans and budgets. Major contributing factors 
include: 1) delayed release of new guidelines for local financial man-
agements; 2) vague expenditure assignments (and the resultant lack 
of KWs and SPMs); and 3) lack of qualified local planning and budg-
eting officials. 
In particular, we found extreme weaknesses in the capacities of 
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local planning and budgeting personnel. Most local government per-
sonnel are stil in the rut of the center-inspired planning and budget-
ing practice, and they have litle or no, experience of conducting 
strategic planning and performance budgeting. Limited capacity 
building support is available from the central government. Training 
initiatives need to come from local governments themselves, 
although strong central and provincial governments'initiatives in 
the provision of coordinated support to local governments are 
urgently needed. This is especially so for the requirement that local 
governments adopt new budgeting and financial management sys-
tems. Again, we emphasize that sufficient human capacity is vital for 
successful decen.tralization. 
Indonesia's decentralization program was initiated to accommo-
date the enormous difficulties in maintaining national unity. As a 
result, decentralization policy was embarked upon without a clear 
consensus on the state structure or system required to guide the 
basic design of decentralization policy (Asanuma and Bambang 
Brodjonegoro 2003). The missing links we found in local develop-
ment planning and budgeting are rooted in this lack of consensus 
among policy makers, as are other major challenges overshadowing 
Indonesia's decentralization. The first three year's experience shows 
that the Government needs to step back at this stage and try to build 
a clear vision of decentralized Indonesia in order to supply the miss-
ing links. Decentralization, by its nature, must be a long process, and 
the expected goals will only achieved after a long process of trial 
and error. It should, therefore, come as no surprise that Indonesia's 
drastic program has some shortcomings at its initial stage. 
Nevertheless, it is the role of the responsible government to pursue 
a consistent decentralization policy with a clear vision and a careful-
ly thought-out strategy. 
(Norio Usui, Associate Professor, Kansai University) 
(Armida S. Alisjahbana, Professor, Padjadjaran University, Indonesia) 
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